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Abstract
In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that
guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We
present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all
the other conditions found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian
implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
In many resource allocation problems, the general properties of decentralized information structures
may be exploited in the construction of decision procedures or contracts to achieve an optimal
allocation, despite market failures due to externalities or to public goods, and despite strategic
behavior, free-riding and misrepresentation of preferences.1 In the transferable utility case, and
for dominant strategy mechanisms, Green and Laffont (1979) and Walker (1980) have shown that
it is in general impossible to balance the budget. On the other hand, as is by now well known, in
Bayesian frameworks where the structure of agents beliefs is explicitly taken into account, one can
find Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (BIC-mechanisms) that balance the budget.2
The main purpose of this note is to clarify, in the transferable utility case, the relationship
between the conditions on beliefs that have been presented in the literature and shown to guarantee
the existence of BIC-mechanisms that implement efficient decision rules with balanced transfers.3
This clarification is based on a new condition, condition C, that is less restrictive than previous ones.
This condition is easier to interpret than the already existing equivalent conditions, namely condition
∗. Reprinted from Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 385–396, 2004.
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1. The first applications belonged to public economics and to the study of collective decision making and auctions (see
Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), but there are many other applications.
2. See among others, d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1975, 1979, 1982), Arrow (1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979),
d’Aspremont et al. (1990), Johnson et al. (1990).
3. Here we mean balancing the budget ex post (for all states of the world). That no condition is required to balance the
budget ex ante is a known fact (d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1982, Theorem 9).
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C∗ introduced4 by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) and LINK introduced by Johnson et al.
(1990).
Condition C has an important consequence: it “guarantees budget balance”, in the sense that
it ensures that any BIC-mechanism can be transformed into a BIC-mechanism that balances the
budget. Since for efficient decision rules, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are BIC-mechanisms
and always exist, it is clear that when condition C holds it is possible to build a balanced budget
BIC-mechanism. Other authors have presented conditions that guarantee budget balance (pairwise
identifiability introduced by Fudenberg et al. (1994, 1996) as well as Assumption I (i) in Aoyagi
(1998), rebaptized weak regularity by Chung (1999), following Matsushima (1991)). Because, as we
show, condition C is both necessary and sufficient for an information structure to guarantee budget
balance, it is less restrictive than these other conditions, and, through examples, we show that it is
strictly less restrictive.
In the final section of the note, we study stronger conditions that guarantee that all decision rules,
even those that are not efficient, can be implemented while balancing the budget, a property that might
be useful in many specific problems (typically those involving only a subset of all agents). We show
that a necessary and sufficient condition for this property is the already known (see d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet, 1982) condition B and that it is a weaker condition than the strict regularity condition
of Aoyagi (1998). Finally, we show that the mechanisms can easily be constructed through a ‘scoring
rules’ method. We also show that, loosely speaking, the class of beliefs satisfying condition C can
be partitioned into those that satisfy condition B and those that satisfy a (very weak) independence
property.
The results presented here leave open a number of important questions, some of which we answer
in d’Aspremont et al. (2003). In particular, among other results, we show (a) that, even though it
is a very general condition, condition C is not necessary for implementation of efficient Bayesian
mechanisms and (b) that it is not true that efficient Bayesian mechanisms always exist.
2. Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
We consider a set N of n ≥ 3 agents.5 All the private information of agent i ∈ N is represented by
his type αi which belongs to a finite set (with at least two elements) Ai. An n-vector of possible
types is denoted α and is an element of A =
∏
i∈NAi.
The utility function of agent i of type αi is defined over a set X of public decisions, and utility
is ‘transferable’: for x ∈ X and a monetary transfer ti ∈ IR, his utility is ui(x;αi) + ti. Some of
our results hold when utility functions have the more general form ui(x;α) + ti, i.e. are mutually
payoff-relevant (Johnson et al., 1990).
The type of agent i also determines his beliefs about the types of the other agents. When he is
of type αi they are represented by a probability distribution over A−i =
∏
j∈N−iAj , the set of the
possible types of the other agents. A generic element of A−i will be denoted α−i; we will sometimes
use the notation α−i−j ∈ A−i−j to denote a vector of possible types of all agents but i and j. We
Also, in this paper, we shall neglect the issue of unicity of equilibrium, so that our use of terms is different from
the language in the literature on implementation (see Palfrey, 2002). In d’Aspremont et al. (1999, 2003), we discuss
conditions that guarantee ‘unique implementation’ both for auctions and balanced Bayesian mechanisms.
4. It was introduced as condition C (without a star) but can be shown equivalent to our new condition (that we will also
call condition C) by a simple duality argument.
5. When n = 2, condition C is equivalent to independence of types, and condition B never holds (see d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet, 1982).
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assume that there exists a probability distribution p over A such that the beliefs p(α−i | αi) of agent
i of type αi are obtained by conditioning p with respect to αi (the beliefs are ‘consistent’), and that
p(αi) > 0 for all i and all αi. Similarly, for i 6= j, the beliefs of agent i on the types of agents
other than himself or j are p(α−i−j | αi) =
∑
αj∈Aj p(α−i | αi). The triplet (N,A, p) is called an
information structure. An environment is composed of an information structure, together with a set
of outcomes and utility functions for the agents and is denoted ({N,A, p},X, {ui}i∈N).
A public decision rule s is a function from A into X: for a vector α of types the public decision
s(α) is taken. It is efficient if
∑
i∈N ui(s(α);αi) ≥
∑
i∈N ui(x;αi) for all α ∈ A and all x ∈ X.
The problem is to implement a decision rule s when the decision mechanism must be based on
private information revealed by the agents. Invoking the revelation principle6, we restrict ourselves
to direct mechanisms in which agents are induced to truthfully reveal their type to the planner; such a
direct mechanism is defined by a decision rule s : A→ X and a transfer rule t : A→ IRn.
We will say that an information structure (N,A, p) guarantees implementation of efficient public
decision rules if for every outcome set7 X, every utility functions ui : X×Ai → IR, i = 1, . . . , n,
and any efficient public decision rule s, we can find a transfer rule t which balances the budget, i.e.,
that satisfies
∑
i∈N ti(α) = 0, for all α ∈ A, and such that the associated direct mechanism (s, t)
satisfies the Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) constraints∑
α−i∈A−i
p(α−i | αi)[ui(s(αi, α−i);αi) + ti(αi, α−i)]
≥
∑
α−i∈A−i
p(α−i | αi)[ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi) + ti(α˜i, α−i)]
(1)
for all i ∈ N, and all αi and α˜i ∈ Ai. Strict implementation is obtained when all (BIC)-inequalities
hold strictly.8 If, in the preceding definition, ‘any efficient decision rule’ is replaced by ‘any decision
rule’, the information structure guarantees implementation of all decision rules.
In this framework, most effort in the literature has been devoted to finding information structures
that guarantee implementation of efficient public decision rules with no additional restriction on
the utility functions. We keep this approach. We introduce no individual rationality constraint.
However, all our results hold true if we add an ex ante individual rationality constraint of the form∑
α∈A p(α)[ui(s(α);αi) + ti(α)] ≥ 0, as long as there is a status quo decision that guarantees each
agent a utility of 0. This is appropriate for many applications in which the contract is signed before
the agents acquire information about their types. For instance, this model has been used to study
agreements to reduce pollution (Duggan and Roberts, 1999), joint research ventures (d’Aspremont
et al., 1998; Bhattacharya et al., 1992), and the contracts between a firm and suppliers (Cremer and
Riordan, 1987; Riordan, 1983, 1984). In all these cases, it is assumed that the parties have symmetric
but imperfect information before contracting, and acquire private information afterwards. The same
dynamic of information acquisition is supposed in the recent theory of the core solution concept
in cooperative games of incomplete information (e.g. Forges et al., 2002) using balanced Bayesian
6. For a statement and references see Fudenberg and Tirole (1992).
7. Because we have only a finite set of types, only a finite subset of decisions are really relevant. The fact that the set X
varies does not create any difficulty, and we could keep it fixed without changing the results it its cardinality was at
least equal to that of A.
8. Notice that we have imposed no uniqueness of equilibrium requirement. In d’Aspremont et al. (1999), we show how
equivalent mechanisms with a single equilibrium can be constructed in nearly all environments.
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mechanisms (and some of the conditions presented below) to represent the bargaining that takes
place within coalitions.
3. Conditions that guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules
Many conditions have been introduced to guarantee implementation of efficient public decision rules.
We will review them, but we start by introducing a condition that will turn out to be weaker than
all others, and that we call condition C because a simple duality argument shows it to be equivalent
to a condition introduced by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) to which we shall refer here as
condition9 C∗. It simply states that beliefs are such that we can collect from the agents any aggregate
transfer, dependent on the state of nature, without inciting them to lie.
3.1 Condition C
An information structure satisfies condition C if and only if for every function R : A→ IR, there
exists a transfer rule tC such that for all α ∈ A∑
i∈N
tCi (α) = R(α) (2)
and such that for all i ∈ N and all αi and α˜i in Ai, αi 6= α˜i, we have∑
α−i∈A−i
tCi (α−i, αi)p(α−i | αi) ≥
∑
α−i∈A−i
tCi (α−i, α˜i)p(α−i | αi). (3)
We show next that condition C is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that any BIC-mechanism
can be modified into a BIC-mechanism that balance the budget.10 To state this formally, we will say
that an information structure guarantees budget balance if, given any set X of public decisions and
any utility functions {ui}i∈N, there exists, for any BIC-mechanism (s, t), another transfer rule t′ that
balances the budget and such that (s, t′) is also a BIC-mechanism.
Lemma 1 An information structure guarantees budget balance if and only if it satisfies condition C.
Proof Given X and {ui}i∈N, consider an information structure (N,A, p) that satisfies condition C
and a BIC-mechanism (s, t). Let R = −∑i∈N ti. By condition C, there exists a transfer rule tC
that satisfies (2) and (3). The transfer rule t′ = t+ tC balances the budget and provides the correct
incentives.
To show the reverse implication, consider an information structure (N,A, p) that guarantees
budget balance. Choose any function R : A→ IR. Pick a payoff structure and a decision rule s such
9. In the consistent case, condition C∗ is: If, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ i ∈ N,
[p(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)p(α−i | α˜i)] = κ(α),
for some λi : Ai × Ai → IR+ (i = 1, . . . , n) and κ : A → IR, then κ must be identically zero. To obtain the
compatibility condition of d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979), just replace each λi(α˜i, αi) by λi(αi, α˜i) on the
left-hand side of the equalities. It was shown to be strictly weaker than C∗ by Johnson et al. (1990). Through
a counterexample, Chung (1999) shows that the regularity condition in Matsushima (1991) does not imply the
compatibility condition. However, as we shall prove, it does imply condition C∗.
10. Johnson et al. (1990), Proposition 5.4, proves this result for condition C∗, but the argument is more intricate.
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that ui(s(α); α˜i) = R(α)/n for all α and all α˜i. It is easy to verify that if we set ti(α) = −R(α)/n
for all α, the inequalities (BIC) hold (with both sides being equal to each other).
Because budget balanced is guaranteed, there exists a transfer function t˜ that satisfies (1) (with
t replaced by t˜) for all α, all α˜i and all i, as well as
∑
i t˜i(α) = 0 for all α. The transfers t
C , with
tCi (α) = ui(s(α);αi) + t˜i(α) = (R(α)/n) + t˜i(α), satisfy (2) and (3), which proves the result.
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Lemma 1 yields an immediate proof of the following theorem.12
Theorem 1 Any information structure that satisfies condition C guarantees implementation of
efficient decision rules.
Proof Consider any X, any {ui}i∈N and any efficient decision rule s. The (BIC) constraints can be
satisfied using transfers of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves type, i.e., tGi (α) =
∑
j 6=i uj(s(α);αj), since,
as well known, these transfers implement any efficient decision rule in dominant strategies. The
result follows from Lemma 1.
Notice that the definition of condition C, as well as the argument of the theorem (and Lemma 1)
could be generalized to environments where the sets of types are not assumed to be finite.13 However,
in the finite case, to verify that condition C holds, it is sufficient to show that it can be solved for
a finite number of functions R˜, those which satisfy |R˜(α′)| = 1 for some α′ ∈ A and R˜(α) = 0
for all α 6= α′. Indeed any function R : A→ IR is a positive linear combination of these functions
R˜. Of course, if we are interested by a specific environment, by the argument of Lemma 1, we can
simply start by constructing a BIC-mechanism (s, t), define R = −∑i∈N ti, and check whether
there exists a transfer rule t˜ that satisfies equations (2) and (3). If it exists, then the transfer rule
t′ = t+ t˜ balances the budget and provides the correct incentives.
Finally, in d’Aspremont et al. (1990), we showed that, with finitely many types, condition C
holds for nearly all14 information structures (see also d’Aspremont et al., 2003, for a simpler proof).
3.2 Other conditions
As known, since d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1975) and Arrow (1979), guaranteeing implemen-
tation of any efficient decision rule can be obtained by assuming some form of independence of
types. Formally, an agent i is said to have free beliefs on a pair {αi, α′i} if for any α−i we have
p(α−i | αi) = p(α−i | α′i). Agent i has free beliefs if he has free beliefs on all pairs of types.
Independence of types holds when all agents have free beliefs. Independence of types implies that
condition C holds. As shown below, it holds even if only one agent has free beliefs (Cremer and
Riordan, 1985, had shown directly that, in this case, it is possible to implement efficient decision
rules).
Interestingly, the other conditions introduced in the literature and shown to guarantee imple-
mentation of efficient decision rules limit in some ways the degree of independence between the
types.
11. It is clear that, with the definitions modified accordingly, this result holds for mutually payoff-relevant utility functions.
This is not true for the following theorem, which relies on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
12. This result was first proved for the ‘compatibility condition’ in d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) and for condition
C∗ in d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982). The present proof is much more immediate.
13. It is much easier for C than for the dual condition C∗ (see d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1982).
14. By ‘nearly all’ we mean on an open and dense subset of the set of probability distributions (which is itself a subset of
IRK , where K =
∑
i∈N#Ai and #Ai is the cardinality of Ai).
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The first of these conditions is Matsushima (1991) regularity condition, which holds if, for some
pair of agents (i, j), the vectors {p(α−i−j | αi)}α−i−j∈A−i−j are linearly independent (note that, for
a given pair (i, j), the dimension of these vectors is equal to the cardinality of the set A−i−j , and
their number is equal to the cardinality of Ai).
Later, Chung (1999) analyzed a weak regularity condition, which is equivalent to Assumption I
(i) in Aoyagi (1998). It holds if there exists a pair of agents (i, j) such that, for all pairs (αi, α′i) in
Ai ×Ai,
{p(α−i−j | αi)}α−i−j∈A−i−j 6= {p(α−i−j | α′i)}α−i∈A−i−j .
Finally, Fudenberg et al. (1994, 1996) introduced the ‘pairwise identifiability condition’. For
any i ∈ N, any α ∈ A, and any ‘deviation’ a˜i(ai) (a function from Ai into itself), define p(a˜i =
αi, α−i) =
∑
{α′i|a˜i(α′i)=αi} p(α
′
i, α−i), and the |Ai||Ai| × |A| matrix
∏
i = [p(a˜i = αi, α−i)](a˜i,α)
(
∏
i is indexed both by the set of deviations and A). Let∏
ij
=
[ ∏
i∏
j
]
.
An information structure satisfies pairwise identifiability if rank
∏
ij = rank
∏
i + rank
∏
j −1 for
every pair of agents (i, j): deviations from truth telling by two agents generate sufficiently different
probability distributions on the n-tuple of reports that a deviating agent can be identified.
As the following theorem shows, condition C is more general than all these conditions.
Theorem 2 An information structure (N,A, p) satisfies condition C if any of the following condition
holds: (i) at least one agent has free beliefs, (ii) weak regularity (or regularity) is satisfied, (iii)
pairwise identifiability is satisfied. Furthermore, condition C is strictly less restrictive than these
three conditions.
Proof (i) If an agent i has free beliefs, say p(α−i), we can easily construct transfers to satisfy Eqs.
(2) and (3). For any R, some i and all j 6= i, let:
ti(α) = R(α)−
∑
α′−i∈A−i
R(α′−i, αi)p(α
′
−i)
and
tj(α) =
 ∑
α′−i∈A−i
R(α′−i, αi)p(α
′
−i)
 /(n− 1).
(ii) As proved by Aoyagi (1998), weak regularity (which is obviously implied by regularity)
guarantees budget balance, and therefore implies condition C (by our Lemma 1). Furthermore, weak
regularity is clearly more restrictive, since it is incompatible with independence of types, which
implies C.15
(iii) Furthermore, Fudenberg et al. (1996) Lemma 1 shows that pairwise identifiability guarantees
budget balance. Hence it implies condition C. To show that C is strictly less restrictive, consider the
15. Section 4 shows further that weak regularity is stronger than C and no independence of types.
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following example. Let {N,A, q} be an information structure, and for i = 1, 2, let Qi = [q(a˜i =
αi, α−i)](a˜i,α−i). Assume that the rank of the matrix
Q12 =
[
Q1
Q2
]
is strictly smaller than rank Q1 + rank Q2 − 1, so that q does not satisfy pairwise identifiability.16
Add now an agent 0, so that we have a new information structure {N ∪ {0},A × A0, p}, with
p(α−0, α0) ≡ q(α−0)r(α0), where r is a probability distribution over A0. Defining the matrices Π1
and Π2 as above, it is straightforward that rank Π1 = rank Q1, rank Π2 = rank Q2 and rank Π12 =
rank Q12. This implies that p does not satisfy pairwise identifiability, but it does satisfy condition C,
since agent 0 has free beliefs.
It should be stressed, finally, that condition C can hold even when no agent has free beliefs (with
n ≥ 3); indeed, condition B introduced in the next section requires that there is no free beliefs and it
implies condition C.
4. Conditions guaranteeing implementation of all decision rules
Sometimes a mechanism designer does not only try to maximize the interests of the participants in a
mechanism; this will happen, for instance, if the participants in the mechanisms are representatives
of the agents whose welfare the mechanism designer cares about, and if the incentives of the
representatives are not perfectly aligned with the welfare of the agents. In order to study this problem,
we will use another condition, called condition B, which was introduced by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-
Varet (1982). It assumes that there exists a balanced transfer rule tB such that for all i ∈ N and all αi
and α˜i in Ai, αi 6= α˜i we have∑
α−i∈A−i
tBi (α−i, αi)p(α−i | αi) >
∑
α−i∈A−i
tBi (α−i, α˜i)p(α−i | αi). (4)
Condition B is important because of the following theorem (which remains valid in the mutually
payoff-relevant case).
Theorem 3 Condition B is necessary and sufficient for an information structure to guarantee the
implementation17 of all decision rules.
Proof It is straightforward to show that condition B is sufficient: for any environment one can
multiply the transfers tBi by a sufficiently large positive number to ensure that the incentives for
truthtelling derived from (4) dominate any incentives from misrepresentation stemming from the
desire to change the public decision.18
16. Such information structures exist.
17. Note that Theorem 3 also holds if ‘implementation’ is replaced by ‘strict implementation’.
18. This technique used here is similar to the techniques used by Cre´mer and McLean (1985); Cremer and McLean (1988),
in the case of auctions. The mechanism designer convinces the agents to announce their true types by making them
‘bet’ on the announcements of the others. This can only yield truthful revelation when the agents’ beliefs about the
others depend on their own types.
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To prove necessity, choose any (i, α0i ) ∈ N×Ai, and a decision rule s that satisfy19 ui(s(α−i, α0i );
α0i ) = −1 for all α−i and uj(s(α); α˜j) = 0 if (j, αj , α˜j) 6= (i, α0i , α0i ). Because the decision rule s
can be implemented, there exists a balanced transfer function t(i,α
0
i ) that satisfies∑
α−i∈A−i
p(α−i | α0i )[t(i,α
0
i )
i (α−i, α
0
i )− t(i,α
0
i )
i (α−i, α˜i)]
≥
∑
α−i∈A−i
p(α−i | α0i )[ui(s(α−i, α˜i);α0i )− ui(s(α−i, α0i );α0i )] = 1
(5)
for all α˜i 6= α0i , and∑
α−j∈A−j
p(α−j | αj)[t(i,α
0
i )
j (α−j , αj)− t
(i,α0i )
j (α−j , α˜j)]
≥
∑
α−j∈A−j
p(α−j | αj)[uj(s(α−j , α˜j);αj)− uj(s(α−j , αj);αj)] = 0
(6)
for all (j, αj) 6= (i, α0i ) and α˜j 6= αj .
The result is proved by repeating this construction for every i ∈ N and every α0i ∈ Ai, and, using
Eqs. (5) and (6), showing that the balanced budget transfer rule obtained by summing the t(i,α
0
i )’s
over all i ∈ N and all α0i ∈ Ai satisfies (4).
Theorem 3 provides a characterization of the set of information structures in which asymmetry of
information does not restrict the implementation of public decisions. When an information structure
does not satisfy condition B, a mechanism designer will know that he must rely on properties of
the information structure and of the utility functions (such as knowing that the decision rule is
efficient). Theorem 3 also has a constructive side: its sufficiency part provides a method for building
BIC-mechanisms.20
It is easy to see that condition B is incompatible with free beliefs, which would imply that
the two sides of Eq. (4) are equal. But condition B is not simply a condition on the absence of
free beliefs as there exist information structures where no agent has free beliefs, and which do not
satisfy condition B (d’Aspremont et al., 2003). On the other hand, Aoyagi (1998) proposes a strict
regularity condition adding to weak regularity the requirement that no agent has free beliefs on any
two types. He shows that this condition guarantees implementation of all decision rules.
More precisely, the relationship between free beliefs, condition B, condition C and the strict
regularity condition is summarized in the following theorem. In the proof, to construct the transfers
tBi , we will use the ‘scoring rules’ method introduced by Good (1952), discussed by Savage (1974),
and applied to Bayesian implementation in Johnson et al. (1990).
Theorem 4 An information structure (N,A, p) satisfies conditionB if and only if it satisfies condition
C and there exists no agent with free beliefs on any two of his types.
The strict regularity condition is strictly more restrictive than condition B.
19. It is possible to find an environment where such a decision rule exists. Choose X = {x0, x1}, ui(x0;α0i ) = −1,
ui(x1;α
0
i ) = 0, ui(x;αi) = 0 for all x ∈ X and all αi 6= α0i , uj(x;αj) = 0 for all j 6= i, all x ∈ X and all αj . We
are implementing a decision rule that minimizes the sum of the utilities of the agents!
20. This constructive argument can be transposed to environments where the sets of types are not finite, at least assuming
that supi,α,α′i |ui(s(α−i, α
′
i);αi)− ui(s(α−i, αi);αi)| is bounded.
In some cases, these mechanisms might have unpleasant properties as they could require large side payments;
then, other techniques for finding mechanisms could be used.
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Proof In the first statement, only the ‘if’ part remains to be proved. Assume that (N,A, p) satisfies
C and that no agent has free beliefs on two types. Take ε small enough and define the transfer rule
θ by θi(α) = log p(α−i | αi) if pi(α−i | αi) > 0 and θi(α) = ε if pi(α−i | αi) = 0. Then the
following strict inequalities are easily verified due to the strict concavity of the function log∑
α−i∈A−i
pi(α−i | αi)θ(α−i, αi) >
∑
α−i∈A−i
pi(α−i | αi)θ(α−i, α˜i)
for all (αi, α˜i) ∈ A2i .
Define R by R(α) = −∑i∈N θi(α) for all α. Because the information structure satisfies C,
there exists a transfer rule tC satisfying Eqs. (2) and (3). For all α, let tBi (α) = θi(α) + t
C
i (α). The
transfer rule tB is balanced and satisfies Eq. (4), and therefore (N,A, p) satisfies condition B.
Aoyagi (1998), Theorem 1, shows that strict regularity of (N,A, p) guarantees implementation
of any public decision rule. Hence, by Theorem 3, it satisfies condition B. To show that it is strictly
more restrictive than B, consider the following information structure (N,A, p), where N = {1, 2, 3}
and Ai = {1, 2, 3} for all i. Let p be equal to 0 if and only if exactly two of the agents have a type
equal to either 1 or 3; for all other states of nature let p equal 1/15 (so that p(1, 1, 2) = p(3, 1, 3) = 0
but p(1, 1, 1) = p(1, 3, 2) = 1/15). This information structure is symmetric in the agents and in the
types 1 and 3 for each agent. For all i we have
{p(αj | αi = 1)}αj∈Aj = {p(αj | αi = 3)}αj∈Aj = (1/4, 1/2, 1/4),
which contradicts weak regularity. To show that condition B holds, define the transfer rule tB as
follows:
tB(1, 1, 1) = tB(2, 2, 2) = tB(3, 3, 3) = (0, 0, 0),
tB(1, 2, 3) = (1,−2, 1); tB(1, 2, 2) = tB(3, 2, 2) = (8,−4,−4)
tB(1, 1, 2) = (3, 3, 2) = tB(1, 1, 3) = tB(3, 3, 1) = (−8,−8, 16).
All other transfers are constructed by permutations on the agents (for example: tB(2, 1, 3) =
(−2, 1, 1)). The transfer rule tB is clearly balanced and may be checked to satisfy (4). The result
follows.21
As a final remark, notice that the ‘scoring rule’ used in the theorem suggests an easy technique
to construct more generally the transfer rule tB ensuring condition B. Consider an information
structure (N,A, p) and let addition and subtraction on the indices of agents be defined modulo
n so that n + 1 ≡ 1 and 1 − 1 ≡ n. For all i, all αi, and all α˜i, we assume (and this holds
generically22) either that pi(α−i−(i−1) | αi) 6= pi(α−i−(i−1) | α˜i) for some α−i−(i−1), or that
pi(α−i−(i+1) | αi) 6= pi(α−i−(i+1) | α˜i) for some α−i−(i+1). Define tB(α) by
tBi (α) = [log pi(α−i−(i−1) | αi)− log pi(α−(i−1)−i | αi−1)]
+ [log pi(α−i−(i+1) | αi)− log pi(α−(i+1)−i | αi+1)].
21. It is important to remark that the results would still hold true if the 0 probabilities in the information structure were
replaced by a small enough ε, adapting the other probabilities accordingly.
22. Genericity has been demonstrated before, not only for condition C∗, as already mentioned, but also for pairwise
identifiability (see Fudenberg et al., 1996) and for strict regularity (see Aoyagi, 1998). Of course, it cannot hold for
free beliefs.
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The negative terms are constant in αi and do not influence the incentives of agent i, but they ensure
that the rule is balanced. The strict concavity of the function log implies that for all i and all αi,
inequality (4) holds, and therefore that condition B is satisfied.
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